Kaplan on Demonstratives. Demonstratives, Indexicals, Pure Indexicals. The best way to start is to get clear on Kaplan’s terminology. Indexicals. Indexicals are words whose meaning depends on context. Kaplan distinguishes between pure indexicals (e.g. I, here, now) and true demonstratives (e.g. that. had written out the formal semantics for my Logic of Demonstratives. David Kaplan is writing at 10 A.M. on 3/26/77, or (ii) the ‘proposition’ that David. Kaplan .
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There are two influential objections to utterance-based theories. On views of this latter sort, semantic values are functions from pairs of contexts and indices to truth-values. A demonstrativss contextualist theory would claim that this adjective is a unary predicate whose content in any context is a unary property.
David Kaplan, Demonstratives – PhilPapers
There is one other category, however, that should be borne in mind when thinking about indexicals and demonstratives. Teresa Marques – – Synthese 8: For the rest of this article, we concentrate exclusively on demonstrative uses of the above pronouns. Another test for context-sensitivity uses attitude ascriptions Cappelen and Lepore Here are kaplna two examples of the demojstratives of puzzles that arise when one begins to think about types versus tokens.
Speakers seem to use complex demonstratives to refer to individuals in much the way that they use simple demonstratives. Thus, the intuitive reflections on what we mean when we say that a sentence S is true at a world suggest a clear answer to the question from two paragraphs back: Relativism and Monadic TruthNew York: The notion of a rigid designator comes from Kripkewho roughly speaking defines a rigid designator to be an expression that designates the same thing with respect to all possible worlds.
Section 5b introduces the second semantic theory of indexicals attributed to Kaplan see the introduction to section 3and briefly discusses reasons most philosophers prefer the semantic demonstrativees introduced in section 3.
DesignationNew York: A structured proposition which, like the preceding one, has an individual as a constituent, is a singular proposition.
Perrythinks that this sort of variation justifies classifying them as discretionary rather than automatic. This runs counter to our clear intuition that we are using the same word twice to refer to different things.
Fara, Delia Graff, John is in a grocery store, pushing demnstratives shopping cart.
Just as a sentence is assigned a truth kqplan relative to a context and a possible world, so a singular term either a proper name or a definite description is assigned a denotation relative to a context and a possible world, and an n -place predicate is assigned an extension a set of n -tuples relative to a context and possible world. Examples are that car, that man who is wearing a baseball hatand that yellow house. Again, if we focus just on the possible world parameter of a context, this means that the world c W of the context c is playing two roles in the definition of truth demonsstratives to a context c: For discussion, see SalmonForbes To say that a proposition p is true or false at a possible demonsratives w is just to say that p would be true false were w actual.
Other expressions have a character that yields different contents relative to different contexts. This formal context differs from the example above only in that the Washington Monument occurs twice: Suppose that he sees the back of his shirt in a mirror, but does not realize that he is viewing his own shirt.
An example discussed earlier in the section on logic will help to illustrate the issue: In contrast to automatic indexicals, Perry argues that some indexicals are such that the referential content of an utterance of them de,onstratives determined in part by certain intentions with which the speaker of the utterance utters them. Oxford University Press, b. In both cases, epistemic possibility is involved.
Indexicals (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Lewis would analyze the messy shopper case as follows. The major issue concerns the property expressed by the common noun phrase inside a complex demonstrative. According to Kaplan, utterance-based theories do not provide adequate resources to explain the logical properties of indexicals and demonstratives.
Lewis also maintains that Kaplan fails to justify his claim that Kaplanian contents have a kalpan role to play in semantics. Lewis claims that there is no theoretical reason to prefer one sort of theory over the other. Therefore, I exist is true in every context. We shall, however, try to avoid discussing the semantics of belief ascriptions. It is a set of possible worlds. When Truth Gives OutOxford: